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Abstract 
 
Recent theoretical literature suggests that aid, geography, and resource endowments affect diversification of exports in 
Africa. This paper examines the validity of these popular views using a System-GMM methodology and panel data for 
African countries. The evidence suggests that aid, the quality of infrastructure, and resource endowments are robust 
determinants of diversification in Africa. It also suggests that there is no systematic relationship between geography 
and diversification. Furthermore, there is some evidence that institutional factors are important although it is not robust. 
Finally, the paper offers recommendations on how to promote export diversification in the region.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Policymakers in developing countries have for several decades been confronted with a very serious 
dilemma. On the one hand, classical trade models suggest that countries should specialize in and 
export goods in which they have comparative advantages (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1983). The 
idea is that by being more specialized in production and exports resource allocation will be more 
efficient and each country will increase its welfare and growth. On the other hand, by specializing 
and exporting a relatively small number of products, countries increase their degree of vulnerability 
to external shocks. Consequently, policymakers have to find ways to deal with this important trade-
off between efficiency and vulnerability. This vulnerability is particularly acute for countries that 
have comparative advantages in the export of primary commodities.1  
 
The prediction of classical trade models that specialization is efficient hinges partly on the 
assumption that there is no uncertainty. Several authors have shown that in the presence of 
uncertainty and risk aversion, diversification may be a better policy option than specialization 
according to comparative advantage (Turnovsky, 1974; Ruffin, 1974). That said, it has also been 
shown that even in the presence of uncertainty, diversification is inefficient if agents have 
reasonable access to financial markets and can borrow to smooth consumption intertemporally 
(Chang, 1991). The problem however is that in most developing countries a large number of people 
live in rural areas, with imperfect and underdeveloped financial markets, and access to borrowing is 
limited. For example, over the period 2000-2004 the rural population as a percentage of total 
population was 24 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, 61 percent in East Asia and the 
Pacific, 65 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and 72 percent in South Asia (World Bank, 2006). In 
rural economies characterized by these market imperfections and no social safety nets, 
diversification provides a mechanism to protect agents against income fluctuations. Consequently, 
although there are good theoretical arguments for specialization according to comparative 
advantage, in practice policymakers in developing countries are interested in diversifying their 
production and export structure to reduce vulnerability to external shocks.  
 
A very important aspect of the structure of African countries is their high export concentration and 
dependence on primary commodity exports. In 1992, developing countries exported 199 
commodities while Africa exported 116 commodities. In 2002, the figures were 210 for developing 
countries and 123 for Africa, indicating that African exports are highly concentrated in relatively 
few products (Table 1). According to UNCTAD (2003) seventeen of the twenty most important 
items exported by African countries are primary commodities and resource-based semi-
manufactures.2 An examination of export concentration indices for Africa also leads to the same 
conclusion. For example, in 1992 the export concentration index for the region was 0.57 compared 
to 0.25 for developing countries. For 2002, the figures were 0.49 and 0.23 for Africa and 
developing countries respectively (UNCTAD, 2004).  
 
 
                                                 
1 Policymakers also face an important trade-off between specializing based on current comparative advantage and 
moving into new and more dynamic or productive sectors in which they currently do not have comparative advantage 
but may acquire advantage in the future. In the literature there is no consensus on whether countries should specialize 
based on current comparative advantage alone, although some authors have emphasized the idea that comparative 
advantage should be seen as a dynamic, as opposed to a static, concept (Redding, 1999). Against this background, there 
has been discussions on the need for public intervention in the determination of productive and export structure of 
economies to ensure that countries produce goods which are most growth-generating (Rodrik, 2005).  
 
2 Note that the main exports of African countries are not dynamic products in world trade. 
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Table 1: Main Exports of African Countries 
COUNTRY EXPORTS   
Algeria Oil, Gas 
Angola Oil, Diamonds, Minerals, Coffee, Fish, Timber 
Benin Cotton, Palm oil 
Botswana Diamonds, Copper, Nickel, Beef 
Burkina Faso  Cotton, Animal Products, Gold 
Burundi Coffee, Tea, Sugar, Cotton, Hides 
Cameroon Crude Oil, Petroleum Products, Timber, Cocoa, Aluminium, Coffee, Cotton 
Cape Verde Shoes, Clothes, Fish, Bananas, Hides, Pozzolana (for making cement) 
Central African Republic Diamonds, Timber, Cotton, Coffee, Tobacco 
Chad Cotton, Oil, Livestock, Textiles 
Comoros Vanilla, Cloves, Perfume oil, Copra 
Congo, Dem. Rep Diamonds, Copper, Coffee, Cobalt, Crude oil 
Congo, Rep. Oil, Timber, Plywood, Sugar, Cocoa, Coffee, Diamonds 
Cote d’Ivoire Cocoa, Coffee, Tropical woods, Petroleum 
Djibouti Re-exports, Hides and skin, Coffee (re-exported from Ethiopia) 
Egypt Petroleum, Petroleum Products, Cotton 
Equatorial Guinea Petroleum, Timber, Cocoa 
Eritrea Livestock, Hides, Sorghum, Textiles, Salt, Light manufactures 
Ethiopia Coffee, Hides, Oil seeds, Beeswax, Sugarcane 
Gabon Crude Oil, Timber, Manganese, Uranium 
Gambia Peanut & Peanut Products, Fish, Cotton lint, Palm kernels 
Ghana Gold, Cocoa, Timber, Tuna, Bauxite, Aluminium, Manganese ore, Diamonds 
Guinea Bauxite, Alumina, Gold, Diamond, Coffee, Fish, Agricultural products 
Guinea-Bissau Cashew Nuts, Shrimps, Peanuts, Palm kernel, Sawn timber 
Kenya Tea, Coffee, Horticultural products, Petroleum products 
Lesotho Clothing, Wool, Mohair, Food, Livestock 
Liberia Diamonds, Iron ore, Rubber, Timber, Coffee, Cocoa 
Libya Crude Oil, Petroleum products, Natural gas 
Madagascar Vanilla, Coffee, Sea food, Cloves, Petroleum products, Chromium, Fabrics 
Malawi Tobacco, Tea, Sugar, Cotton 
Mali Cotton, Gold, Livestock 
Mauritania Fish and Fish Products, Iron ore, Gold 
Mauritius Sugar, Clothing, Tea, Jewellery 
Morocco Minerals, Seafood products, Citrus fruits 
Mozambique Sea food , Cotton,  
Namibia Diamonds, Copper, Gold, Zinc, Lead, Uranium, Livestock 
Niger Uranium, Livestock products 
Nigeria Petroleum, Petroleum products, Cocoa, Rubber 
Rwanda Coffee, Tea, Hides, Tin ore 
Sao Tome and Principe Cocoa 
Senegal Fish, Peanuts, Petroleum products, Phosphates, Cotton 
Seychelles Fish, Cinnamon bark, Copra, Petroleum products (re-exports) 
Sierra Leone Diamonds, Rutile, Cocoa, Coffee, Fish 
Somalia Livestock, Bananas, Hides, Fish 
South Africa Gold, Diamonds, Metals & Minerals, Cars, Machinery 
Sudan Oil, Cotton, Sesame, Livestock & Hides, Gum arabic 
Swaziland Sugar, Wood pulp, Minerals 
Tanzania Sisal, Cloves, Coffee, Cotton, Cashew nuts, Minerals, Tobacco 
Togo Cocoa, Phosphates, Coffee, Cotton 
Tunisia Agricultural Products, Textiles, Oil 
Uganda Coffee, Fish & Fish products, Tea, Tobacco, Cotton, Corn, Beans, Sesame 
Zambia Copper, Minerals, Tobacco 
Zimbabwe Tobacco, Cotton, Agricultural products, Gold, Minerals 
Source:  Authors compilation based on information obtained from various editions of country reports produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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High dependence on commodities is of concern because it increases terms of trade and 
macroeconomic instability, with potential consequences for output. Furthermore, it could 
potentially increase the incidence of poor governance and political conflicts. For example, Sachs 
and Warner (1995) argue that there is a negative relationship between natural resource abundance 
and economic growth due in part to the fact that resource exports generate huge economic rents. It 
has also been argued that natural resource dependence increases the risk of civil wars by providing 
resources for rebel groups (Collier, 2003). More importantly, the dependence of African countries 
on commodity exports is of concern because the region needs high and sustained growth to make a 
significant impact on poverty and history has shown that the manufacturing sector is the main 
source of dynamic and sustained growth (UNCTAD, 2003). The literature on endogenous growth 
also emphasizes the importance of increasing returns to scale in the manufacturing sector in long-
run growth (Matsuyama, 1992).  
 
One of the reasons why the manufacturing sector is important for dynamic and sustained growth is 
that unlike primary commodities, manufactured goods tend to have high income elasticities of 
demand and so have more opportunities for export market expansion. By exporting primary 
commodities, African countries cannot exploit this crucial potential of manufactures for growth and 
poverty reduction. Lifting this constraint to high and sustained growth is critical to improving the 
economic performance of the region and enhancing prospects for meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals. It is true that since the mid-1990s, there has been an improvement in the 
economic performance of Africa, but recent growth rates observed in the region are still low 
relative to the 7 percent rate deemed necessary to make a significant reduction in poverty (UNECA, 
2006). They are also low relative to rates observed in South Asia and East Asia and the Pacific 
(figure 1). Therefore, successful diversification into manufactures is needed to increase the 
likelihood that African countries will be able to reverse this trend in economic performance. 
 
 
Figure 1: Real GDP per capita growth 
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Source: World Bank (2006) 
 
In the literature, several explanations have been offered for Africa’s excessive dependence on 
primary commodity exports and why the region has not made significant progress in diversifying 
into the production and export of manufactured goods (see Collier, 2003). Three of these 
explanations have attracted attention in recent years and focus on the impact of geography, foreign 
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aid, and natural resource endowments. Several authors have emphasized the importance of 
geographical barriers in the determination of export structure and performance (Breinlich, 2005; 
Redding and Venables, 2003; Radelet and Sachs, 1998). The idea is that transport costs are high in 
countries that are geographically isolated from large markets or suppliers and that this inhibits the 
successful development of manufacturing activities. More specifically, geographic distance or lack 
of proximity to key export markets can lead to lack of competitiveness and make it difficult for a 
country to export manufactured goods. Based on this theory, countries that are landlocked, or have 
limited access to coasts or sea-navigable rivers, should have more concentrated export patterns and 
less ability to develop manufacturing exports than those that do not face these geographical barriers.  
 
Another explanation for lack of diversification in Africa emphasizes the role of foreign aid (van 
Wijnbergen, 1985). The idea is that large aid inflows have the potential to increase the price of non-
traded goods leading to a real exchange rate appreciation and loss of export competitiveness. This 
effect is likely to be more severe in economies with capital market imperfections and in the 
manufacturing sector—where there are externalities such as learning-by-doing. When there is 
learning by doing in a sector, productivity depends on cumulative output over time. Consequently, 
by appreciating the real exchange rate and reducing output in the export sector, aid leads to a loss of 
productivity and so has a negative effect on the development and expansion of manufacturing 
activities.  
 
The third explanation for lack of diversification in Africa focuses on the role of education and 
natural resources. This view follows the work of Wood and Mayer (2001; 1998) and the theory is 
based on an extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The authors are of the view that the 
differences in export structure between Africa and other developing countries arise from differences 
in supplies of human and natural resources. They argue that African countries are land abundant 
relative to countries in Asia. In their model, abundant land raises real income and undermines 
competitiveness, through its adverse effect on the real exchange rate, thereby making it difficult for 
Africa to develop successful manufacturing export activities relative to land-scarce developing 
regions. Consequently, in this framework, Africa’s excessive dependence on primary commodity 
exports is caused by low levels of education and abundant natural resources. Note that in this model 
land is used in a broad sense to include all sorts of natural resources—land area, oil, minerals etc 
(Wood and Mayer, 2001; 1998). Therefore, in the empirical analysis we use both measures of land 
and oil abundance to capture the impact of resource endowments. 
 
This paper examines the empirical validity of these three popular explanations for lack of 
diversification in Africa and its excessive dependence on primary commodity exports. The tests are 
conducted using panel data for African countries spanning the period 1985-2002. They are also 
based on the System-GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) approach, which is a statistical 
methodology approriate for dealing with models with lagged dependent variables and can account 
for the potential endogeneity of regressors as well as heterogeneity across countries. The rest of the 
paper is structured as follows. The next section looks at the structural characteristics of African 
countries, as well as changes that have taken place in these features, relative to other developing 
countries. Section III establishes some stylized facts on the correlation between diversification,on 
the one hand, and measures of aid, geography, and resource endowments on the other. Section IV 
discusses the econometric method used in the analyses and presents the results of the empirical 
tests. Section V discusses policy implications of the analyses and offers some concluding remarks. 
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II. Structural Characteristics 
 
In this section, we look at selected aspects of the structure of economies in Sub-Saharan Africa 
relative to those in Asia and Latin America. The objective is to determine whether or not there have 
been any significant changes in the characteristics of African economies relative to those observed 
in other developing countries. One of the noticeable changes that have taken place in the structure 
of African economies is the decline in the share of agriculture in gross domestic product (GDP). In 
1990 agriculture accounted for 20 percent of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to 9 percent in 
Latin America and Caribbean, 25 percent in East Asia and the Pacific, and 31 percent in South 
Asia. In 2004, the share of agriculture in GDP fell to 16 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 13 percent 
in East Asia and the Pacific, and 21 percent in South Asia. In Latin America and the Caribbean the 
share was the same as in 1990. As in most developing regions, the decline in the share of 
agriculture in GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa has been accompanied by a rise in the share of services. 
Presently, the service sector accounts for roughly fifty percent of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Despite this decline in the share of agriculture in GDP the sector still accounts for a significant 
percentage of employment in Sub-Saharan Africa (roughly two-thirds of employment).  
 
Table 2 presents data on other structural characteristics and changes that have taken place in 
developing countries. As the table shows, relative to other developing countries, Sub-Saharan 
Africa has very low life expectancy at birth and high dependency ratio. For each of these indicators, 
the gap between Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing regions increased in the first half of the 
new Millennium. To the extent that these have implications for labour supply, they are certainly not 
conducive to the development of a vibrant manufacturing sector. Another interesting difference 
between Sub-Saharan Africa and the other regions is that it has low savings ratios. Over the period 
2000-2004, gross domestic savings in the sub-region represented about 18 percent of GDP 
compared to 20 percent in South Asia, 21 percent in Latin America, and 35 percent in East Asia and 
the Pacific. Given the low saving rates observed in Sub-Saharan Africa it is not surprising that the 
sub-region is the most dependent on foreign aid. The ratio of aid to gross capital formation in Sub-
Saharan Africa is relatively high. For example, over the period 2000-2004 the ratio was 27 percent 
compared to 1.2 percent in East Asia and the Pacific, 1.5 percent in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and 3.8 percent in South Asia. The high degree of dependence on aid often raises 
concerns about the possibility of a link between aid dependence and the lack of success in 
diversification in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
 
Table 2: Aspects of the Structure of Developing Economies  
Variable 1980-84 2000-2004 
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) 
• Sub-Saharan Africa 
• Latin America & Caribbean 
• South Asia 
• East Asia and Pacific 
 
19.95 
22.68 
16.04 
32.13 
 
17.66 
21.19 
20.63 
35.63 
Aid  (% of gross capital formation) 
• Sub-Saharan Africa 
• Latin America & Caribbean 
• South Asia 
• East Asia and Pacific 
 
15.42 
1.7 
6.56 
2.81 
 
26.81 
1.53 
3.80 
1.16 
Manufacturing value added (% of GDP) 
• Sub-Saharan Africa 
• Latin America & Caribbean 
• South Asia 
• East Asia and Pacific 
 
16.27 
26.52 
15.88 
32.43 
 
13.91 
16.71 
15.68 
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Manufactured exports (% of merchandise exports) 
• Sub-Saharan Africa 
• Latin America & Caribbean 
• South Asia 
• East Asia and Pacific 
 
10.06 
18.67 
53.1 
35.30 
 
32.84 
57.25 
78.21 
80.37 
Arable land (% of total land area)  
• Sub-Saharan Africa 
• Latin America & Caribbean 
• South Asia 
• East Asia and Pacific 
 
5.86 
6.32 
42.46 
10.50 
 
7.28 
7.11 
41.95 
13.26 
Life expectancy at birth (total years) 
• Sub-Saharan Africa 
• Latin America & Caribbean 
• South Asia 
• East Asia and Pacific 
 
48.40 
64.97 
54.17 
64.90 
 
46.05 
71.74 
63.12 
69.63 
Dependency ratio (%) 
• Sub-Saharan Africa 
• Latin America & Caribbean 
• South Asia 
• East Asia and Pacific 
 
0.94 
0.78 
0.76 
0.66 
 
0.90 
0.59 
0.65 
0.48 
Source: World Bank (2006). 
 
 
Africa also differs from other developing regions in terms of land endowments. For example, it is 
well-known that in terms of land area, the African region is relatively land abundant. In 2004, the 
total land area in Sub-Saharan Africa was 23, 596 thousand square kilometres compared to 20, 057 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, 15,885 in East Asia and the Pacific, 8,955 in Middle East and 
North Africa, and 4,781 in South Asia (World Bank, 2006). A less known fact is that the ratio of 
arable to total land area is higher in Asia compared to Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 2 shows that for 
the period 2000-2004, the ratio was 42 percent in South Asia, 13 percent in East Asia and the 
Pacific, and 7 percent in both Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Consequently, while Sub-Saharan Africa is land abundant in terms of total land area, it is land-
scarce in terms of the percentage of arable to total land area.  
 
 
Table 3: Classification of African Countries by Manufactures Exports 
Share of manufactures in total exports Range (%) 
1985-87                                           2000-2002 
0 - 15 Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Benin, Central 
African Republic, Cameroon, Congo Republic, 
Comoros, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, 
Mozambique, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Seychelles, Zambia 
Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Benin, 
Central African Republic, Congo 
Republic, Comoros, Cape Verde, 
Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Swaziland 
16 - 30 Cote d’Ivoire, Cape Verde, Madagascar,  
Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, Togo, Zimbabawe 
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire , Malawi, 
Namibia, Senegal, Togo, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
31 and above Egypt, Mauritius, Tunisia Egypt, Morocco, Madagascar, 
Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Tunisia 
Source : World Bank (2006). 
 
 
As indicated earlier, relative to other developing countries, Sub-Saharan Africa has an export 
structure that is highly concentrated in primary commodities. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the sub-
region shared this feature of dependence on commodities with most developing countries. However, 
in the past two decades, several developing countries have successfully transformed their export 
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structure and are no longer dependent on primary commodities. For example, in the period 2000-
2004, the share of manufactures in total exports was 33 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa compared to 
57 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, 78 percent in South Asia, and 80 percent in East 
Asia and the Pacific. For developing countries as a group, manufactures represent about eighty 
percent of their exports. Africa happens to be the only developing country region that has not gone 
through this major structural transformation. That said, within the African region a few countries 
have made progress on diversification (table 3). For example, in the period 2000-2002, the share of 
manufactures in total exports was 45 percent in Egypt, 46 percent in Rwanda, 52 percent in 
Morocco, 66 percent in Seychelles, 71 percent in Tunisia, and 73 percent in Mauritius. 
 
While there is a big difference between Sub-Saharan Africa and other developing country regions 
based on the share of manufactures in total exports, a look at the share of manufacturing value-
added in GDP presents a different picture. With the exception of East Asia and the Pacific, there 
isn’t really much difference between Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia or Latin America and the 
Caribbean over the period 2000-2004. Furthermore, relative to the period 1980-84, there has been a 
significant decline in the share of manufacturing value-added in GDP in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. The ratio also fell in Sub-Saharan Africa but the magnitude is much less than in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Within Africa, some countries have made significant progress in the 
growth of manufacturing value-added since the 1990s (see table 4). For example, over the period 
1991-2001, the average growth in manufacturing value-added was about 13 percent in Uganda, 9 
percent in Ethiopia, 8 percent in Equatorial Guinea and Burkina Faso. In eight Sub-Saharan African 
countries the growth in manufacturing value-added was negative over the same period: Burundi (-
5.8 percent), Comoros (-1.3 percent), Congo Republic (-1.2 percent), Congo Democratic Republic 
(-5.4 percent), Djibouti (-7.6 percent), Guinea Bissau (-3.5 percent), Malawi (-2.1 percent), and 
Mauritania (-1.1 percent). 
 
 
Table 4: Manufacturing Value-added (MVA) in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(1981-2001) 
MVA per capita 
(dollars) 
Share of MVA in GDP 
(%) 
MVA annual growth 
rates (%) 
 
Country 
 1981 1991 2001 1981 1991 2001 1981-1991 1991-2001 
Angola 89 52 41 8.5 4.9 4.8 -3.4 1.9 
Benin 38 31 39 9.2 7.6 8.1 2.2 5.3 
Botswana 103 154 192 6.2 4.9 4.8 8.7 4.5 
Burkina Faso 48 46 72 16.9 14.2 18.2 2.0 7.7 
Burundi 19 24 13 9.9 11.7 8.9 5.6 -5.8 
Cameroon 138 147 146 11.9 14.8 14.9 2.2 2.8 
Cape Verde 38 84 109 5.4 8.5 7.7 9.6 6.2 
Central African Rep. 38 49 40 3.9 10.1 8.6 3.1 0.05 
Chad 29 36 33 18.6 16.2 16.1 4.8 3.6 
Comoros 12 16 15 3.5 3.8 4.1 4.1 -1.3 
Congo, Rep. Of 76 102 78 6.6 8.2 8.2 5.2 -1.2 
Congo, Democratic Rep. 38 21 7 11.9 9.4 8.6 -0.5 -5.4 
Cote d’Ivoire 231 174 185 19.6 20.9 21.6 3.2 3.8 
Djibouti 51 37 20 4.9 4.4 3.2 1.7 -7.6 
Equatorial Guinea 8 6 11 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.9 8.3 
Ethiopia 13 7 15 6.8 4.2 6.0 -0.7 9.1 
Gabon 393 413 307 5.4 6.3 5.1 1.6 0.7 
Gambia 14 19 15 3.9 5.5 4.4 7.2 1.2 
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Ghana 37 37 44 9.2 9.4 9.2 6.2 4.0 
Guinea 17 21 20 3.4 4.5 3.7 5.5 2.1 
Guinea Bissau 32 17 12 14.9 6.8 6.0 -5.3 -3.5 
Kenya 33 37 34 9.6 10.3 10.4 5.1 1.9 
Lesotho 15 41 58 5.0 10.6 12.4 13.1 5.5 
Madagascar 32 26 25 11.4 11.3 10.8 2.2 2.7 
Malawi 34 33 23 15.7 16.5 11.1 4.0 -2.1 
Mali 17 23 23 6.1 8.6 7.5 7.1 2.6 
Mauritania 52 50 36 9.2 9.7 6.2 2.4 -1.1 
Mauritius 225 513 842 14.2 19.9 20.7 11.0 5.9 
Namibia 207 190 216 9.2 9.9 9.7 2.7 2.9 
Niger 19 20 18 4.2 6.1 6.4 4.3 3.9 
Nigeria 25 22 18 6.7 5.7 4.9 1.6 1.1 
Rwanda 74 60 55 17.7 15.5 15.7 1.2 5.4 
Senegal 90 97 118 12.3 12.9 13.6 3.9 4.8 
Seychelles 276 618 669 7.3 11.6 12.4 8.9 5.4 
Sierra Leone 7 6 7 2.6 3.0 4.9 2.8 1.5 
Somalia … … … … … … ...  
South Africa 777 618 597 20.7 20.7 19.3 0.8 1.6 
St Tome and Principe 26 24 24 6.2 5.5 5.3 0.3 1.7 
Sudan 98 89 112 8.9 8.7 6.6 1.3 4.5 
Swaziland 110 329 362 13.6 29.6 28.8 17.9 2.9 
Tanzania 18 14 13 10.9 8.5 8.0 0.7 3.3 
Togo 48 48 41 8.9 10.5 10.1 3.1 3.4 
Uganda 8 10 26 4.3 5.4 9.9 5.0 13.5 
Zambia 56 56 59 9.5 12.4 15.0 4.5 2.3 
Zimbabwe 192 146 139 22.1 20.0 19.1 3.1 0.3 
Source:   UNIDO (2004) 
 
 
 
III.  Establishing some Stylized Facts 
 
In this section of the paper, we ask whether there is evidence of any co-movement between 
diversification and the three variables of interest, namely aid, geography and human or natural 
resources. Obviously, correlations do not imply causality but they do help to establish stylized 
facts. In general, the results reported in this section are based on a sample of 31 African countries 
for which we have data on the relevant variables. However, for the correlations using measures of 
education and geography the sample size is less than 31 because some of the countries in the initial 
sample do not have data on these variables.   
 
In figure 2, we plot the share of manufactures in total exports against the share of aid in gross 
capital formation. The figure shows evidence of a negative relationship. That is, across countries an 
increase in the share of aid in gross capital formation is associated with a reduction in the share of 
manufactures in total exports. Table 5 presents the correlation between aid and the share of 
manufacturing in total exports. The correlation between the two variables is negative (36 percent) 
and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The results suggests that countries that depend 
heavily on aid should, on average, have less diversified exports than those that do not depend on 
aid. Note that in terms of per capita aid, the main aid recipients in Africa in 2004 were Cape Verde 
($282), Sao Tome and Principe ($281), Seychelles ($124), Swaziland ($104), and Zambia ($94) and 
Senegal ($92). However, in terms of the total monetary value of aid, the main recipients in the 
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region in 2004 were Ethiopia ($1,823 million), Democratic Republic of Congo ($1,815 milllion), 
Tanzania ($1,746), Egypt ($1,458), and Ghana ($1,358).  
 
 
Figure 2: Aid and Diversification 
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Table 5: Cross-section Correlations with Diversification 
Variable Correlation Coefficient No of countries 
Aid  -0.357 ** 
(0.049) 
31 
Education  0.253 
(0.223) 
25 
Geography Distcr 
 
Troppop 
 
Pop100cr 
-0.416 ** 
(0.034) 
-0.435 ** 
(0.024) 
0.455 ** 
(0.017) 
27 
 
27 
 
27 
Land endowment  0.225 
(0.224) 
31 
 
 
Regarding geography, the correlation between this variable and diversification is negative and 
statistically significant at conventional levels as suggested by various theories (table 5 and figure 
3). In other words, there is evidence that an increase in geographic distance from markets is 
associated with a decrease in diversification across countries. It is interesting to note that this result 
is robust to the measure of geography used in the correlation analysis. Three measures of geography 
were used in the analysis: the mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (distcr); the 
percentage of the population in the geographical tropics (troppop); and the percentage of the total 
population within 100 km of ice-free coast or navigable river (pop100cr). The first two variables 
are expected to have a negative sign while the last variable is expected to have a positive sign and 
this is what we see in the correlation results. 
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Figure 3: Geography and Diversification 
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Turning to education, figure 4 suggests that there is a positive but weak correlation between the 
literacy rate (our proxy for education) and diversification. More specifically, the correlation 
coefficient between the two variables is low (25 percent) and is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels (table 5). Consequently, the results suggest that there is no robust link between 
literacy and diversification. This may be because the literacy rate is not a very good proxy for the 
type of skilled labour that is assumed necessary for diversification into non-traditional exports. In 
our analysis, the literacy rate was used as a proxy due to data limitations.  
 
Figure 4: Education and Diversification 
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Finally, we examined the correlation between land abundance, as measured by the share of arable to 
total land area, and diversification. Based on the theoretical models described earlier, there should 
be a negative relationship between land abundance and diversification. However, as figure 5 shows, 
there is no clear association between the share of arable to total land and diversification. The 
correlation coefficient between the two variables is positive (0.22) but is statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels.   
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Figure 5: Land Endowment and Diversification 
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Since the manufacturing sector is the source of dynamic and sustained growth (UNCTAD, 2003), 
this part of the paper also examines the relationship between manufacturing value-added and our 
three key variables of interest, namely aid, geography and natural resources. Table 6 presents the 
cross-section correlation between these variables.  
 
 
Table 6: Correlations with Manufacturing Value-added 
Variable Correlation Coefficient No of countries 
Aid  -0.237 
(0.199) 
31 
Education  0.430 ** 
(0.032) 
25 
Geography Distcr 
 
Tropical population 
 
Pop100cr 
-0.135 
(0.503) 
-0.533 *** 
(0.004) 
0.102 
(0.614) 
27 
 
27 
 
27 
Land endowment  0.085 
(0.650) 
31 
 
 
The key points that emerge from this table are as follows. First, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between aid flows and manufacturing value-added across countries in the sample. 
Second, the correlation between land endowment and manufacturing value-added is positive but 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Third, there is strong evidence of co-movement 
between education and manufacturing value-added. The correlation between these two variables is 
43 percent and is statistically significant at 5 percent level. Finally, there is weak evidence that 
geography is negatively correlated with manufacturing value-added. However, this evidence is not 
robust because the result is sensitive to the measure of geography used. In particular, it is 
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significant when we use the share of total population in the tropics as a measure of geography and 
insignificant when the other two measures are used. 
 
 
IV.  The Empirical Methodology and Results 
 
To examine the validity of the three theories or explanations for lack of diversification in Africa, we 
estimate a dynamic panel data equation of the form: 
  
Divers Divers A G R Xit it it i it j ijt
j
i= + + + + +− it+∑α β µ θ λ η1 ε                                             (1)  
Where: 
•  is the measure of diversification in country i  at time ; Diversit t
•  is a measure of aid in country  at time ; Ait i t
•  is a measure of geography in country i ; Gi
•  is a measure of resource endowment in country  at time ;  Rit i t
•  is control variable  in country i  at time ; Xijt j t
• ηi  is an unobserved country-specific effect; 
• εit  is an i.i.d. error term. 
 
Equation (1) has a lagged dependent variable to account for dynamics in the diversification process 
and capture the fact that diversification does not take place overnight. It also includes unobserved 
country-specific effects to capture heterogeneity across countries in diversification. It is important 
to note that the structure of equation (1) rules out the use of certain estimation techniques. For 
example, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach cannot be used because the estimator is 
biased in the presence of lagged dependent variables or country-specific effects on the right hand 
side of the equation. Fixed-Effects estimators can account for the country-specific effects but will 
remain biased in the presence of lagged dependent variables. Furthermore, the Fixed-Effects 
estimator is not an appropriate technique to use here because some of the explanatory variables of 
interest—geography—are time-invariant and their parameters will not be identified using this 
estimator. To address some of these econometric problems we use the System-GMM estimator 
developed for dynamic panel data estimation (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bover, 1995). 
It controls for the country-specific effects as well as the bias caused by the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable. Furthermore, unlike the first-difference GMM approach discussed in Arellano 
and Bond (1991), the System-GMM approach makes it possible to identify the parameters of the 
time-invariant variables in the model. The estimations conducted in this section are based on 
unbalanced panel data over the period 1985-2002 and the sample consists of twenty-two African 
countries for which we have data on the variables needed for the analysis. 
 
The measure of diversification used in the analysis is the share of manufactures in total exports. 
UNCTAD has also computed diversification indices for African countries. However, the UNCTAD 
index was not used because it has several missing values and, for several countries, is available for 
only a few years. Using this index would have reduced the sample size considerably and make it 
difficult to obtain precise estimates of the parameters of interest. Consequently, the share of 
manufactures in total exports was used as a proxy for diversification in the paper. Two variables 
were used to capture the impact of resource endowments. The first is the ratio of arable to total land 
area and the second is a dummy for oil producing and exporting nations. The use of these two 
variables allows us to determine whether the results are sensitive to the type of resource endowment 
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under consideration. The share of aid in gross capital formation was used to capture the effect of aid 
on diversification. Regarding geography, three measures or proxies were used: the mean distance to 
nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (distcr); the percentage of the population in the 
geographical tropics (troppop); and the percentage of the total population within 100 km of ice-free 
coast or navigable river (pop100cr). Based on the theory, the first two measures are expected to 
have a negative relationship with diversification while the last measure is expected to have a 
positive relationship with diversification. 
 
Another issue that needs to be addressed is the choice of control variables used in the regression. 
The approach adopted is to include a broad set of potential explanatory variables suggested either 
by theory or the recent empirical literature on the subject. Based on this approach, five control 
variables were used in the analysis. The first control variable we include in the regression is the 
quality of infrastructure, measured by the number of telephone lines per 1000 persons. The 
availability of basic and good quality infrastructure is needed for the development and support of a 
vibrant manufacturing sector (Abuka, 2005). The level of development, as measured by real per 
capita income, is also one of the variables we control for. The idea is that countries at higher levels 
of income are likely to be more diversified than those at lower levels of income (Imbs and 
Wacziarg, 2003). We also controlled for the potential effect of macroeconomic policy. The measure 
of macroeconomic policy used in the analysis is the inflation rate. Alternatively, we could have 
used the real effective exchange rate. However, we did not use this variable for two reasons. The 
first is that several countries in the sample do not have long time series on the real effective 
exchange rate. Secondly, aid is one of the explanatory variables in the model and theory suggests 
that it affects diversification through its impact on the real exchange rate (van Wijnbergen, 1985). 
Consequently, the aid variable captures the effect of the real exchange rate on diversification and so 
there is really no need to have a separate control for this variable in the regression. Education is 
also considered vital for diversification (Wood and Mayer, 2001; 1998). Therefore, we included a 
control for education in the equation. In the estimation, the literacy rate was used as a proxy for 
education due to lack of data on skilled labour. Finally, we controlled for the impact of the quality 
of institutions on diversification. Levchenko (2004) shows that institutional differences are sources 
of comparative advantage and hence a determinant of the pattern of trade flows. In the estimations, 
the durability of the political regime in a country was used as a proxy for the quality of institutions. 
The expectation is that a more durable political regime will lead to more diversification. Table 7 
presents descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical analyses. More detailed 
definition of variables as well as the sources of data are in the appendix.   
 
 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Mean Standard deviation No. of observations 
Diversification 16.39 17.89 392 
Aid  (% of gross capital formation) 70.25 83.65 396 
Arable to total land area 14.16 11.91 396 
Level of development  2093.30 1675.11 396 
Inflation rate 13.95 23.12 396 
Education (literacy rate) 53.48 18.73 386 
Quality of infrastructure  15.29 20.00 396 
Durability of political regime 13.44 12.29 391 
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Geography 
 
• Distcr 
 
• Troppop 
 
• Pop100cr 
 
 
508.55 
 
0.76 
 
0.31 
 
 
350.30 
 
0.41 
 
0.31 
 
 
396 
 
396 
 
396 
 
 
Table 8 presents results of estimation of equation (1) by System-GMM. The column (GMM1) 
reports results of estimation of the model using “distcr” as a measure of geography. The equations 
were estimated using lags of all variables dated t-2 and earlier as instruments. Using the Hansen test 
for overidentifying restrictions we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the instruments used are 
uncorrelated with the residuals. Consequently, the test suggests that the instruments used are valid. 
The test for AR(1) errors in the first difference equation rejects the null hypothesis of no first-order 
serial correlation as expected. Furthermore, as should be expected, the test for AR(2) errors suggest 
that we cannot reject the null of no second order serial correlation. Turning to the regression 
estimates, the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. This suggests that there is some path dependence in the diversification process. 
The aid variable has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In 
order words, an increase in aid has a negative effect on diversification in the sample. This finding is 
in line with the predictions of  theoretical models that aid can have a negative effect on 
diversification because of its potential impact on the real exchange rate. The results also suggest 
that land endowment, as measured by the share of arable to total land area, is a determinant of 
diversification in the region. In particular, an increase in the ratio of arable to total land area 
increases diversification. The coefficient on the variable is positive and statistically significant at 
conventional levels. This finding is interesting because it suggests that land abundance does not 
necessarily lead to less diversification as implied by recent theoretical explanations for lack of 
diversification in Africa (see Wood and Mayer, 2001 and 1998). The finding makes sense because 
if we look at the data for developing country regions, we find that South Asia and East Asia and the 
Pacific have higher ratios of arable to total land area and are also more diversified than Sub-
Saharan Africa.3  
 
Regarding the role of education, the results suggest that the variable is insignificant at conventional 
levels. This may be because the literacy rate is not a very good proxy for the labour skills 
considered necessary for effective diversification into dynamic sectors of world trade. As indicated 
earlier, we used the literacy rate in the analysis because of data limitations. The results also suggest 
that geography is not a key determinant of diversification in the region. Although the variable 
measuring geography has the expected sign, it is insignificant at conventional levels. We tried 
different measures of geography to see if it makes a difference in terms of the results but there was 
no change in the qualitative results. The columns (GMM2 and GMM3) present results of estimation 
of equation (1) using alternative measures of geography. As can be seen from the table, the 
geography variables are insignificant in all cases. This finding supports the recent analyses by the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation that geography is not the main reason for lack 
of diversification in Africa (UNIDO, 2004).  
 
                                                 
3 Clearly, in terms of physical land area, Sub-Saharan Africa is more land abundant than other regions of the world. 
However, what is really important in terms of export competitiveness is the quality of available land. When this later 
variable is accounted for, Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be considered to be more land abundant as it has less land quality 
relative to most developing country regions.  
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Table 8: System GMM Estimation Results 
 GMM1 GMM2 GMM3 
Diversification (t-1) 0.743 *** 
(0.000) 
0.749 *** 
(0.000) 
0.746 *** 
(0.000) 
Aid  (% of gross capital formation) -0.007 ** 
(0.024) 
-0.007 *** 
(0.003) 
-0.007 *** 
(0.002) 
Arable to total land area (%) 0.139 ** 
(0.028) 
0.139 ** 
(0.024) 
0.137 ** 
(0.024) 
Level of development -0.0004 
(0.591) 
-0.0003 
(0.619) 
-0.001 
(0.278) 
Inflation rate -0.008 
(0.486) 
-0.006 
(0.618) 
-0.005 
(0.648) 
Education -0.029 
(0.437) 
-0.028 
(0.454) 
-0.025 
(0.519) 
Quality of infrastructure 0.166 *** 
(0.000) 
0.163 *** 
(0.000) 
0.166 *** 
(0.000) 
Durability of political regime 0.084 * 
(0.060) 
0.086 * 
(0.068) 
0.080 * 
(0.086) 
Geography 
• Distcr 
 
 
• Pop100cr 
 
 
• Troppop 
 
-0.001 
(0.665) 
 
 
 
 
0.355 
(0.894) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.808 
(0.450) 
    
Hansen test 14.08 
(1.000) 
10.66 
(1.000) 
10.83 
(1.000) 
Test for AR(1) errors -3.17 ** 
(0.002) 
-3.14 ** 
(0.002) 
-3.13 ** 
(0.002) 
Test for AR(2) errors -0.64 
(0.520) 
-0.64 
(0.521) 
-0.63 
(0.530) 
No of countries 22 22 22 
No of observations 356 356 356 
Notes: GMM1 refers to the benchmark regression estimation where we use distcr as a measure of geography; GMM2 is estimation using pop100cr as 
a measure of geography; and GMM3 is estimation using troppop as a measure of geography. 
 
 
The results support the widely held view that the quality of infrastructure is critical to 
diversification in the region. The coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically significant 
at 1 percent level. In addition, the result is robust to the use of different measures of geography. The 
results suggest that African countries should adopt an effective policy on infrastructure 
development if they are to make significant progress in diversifying their economies. Another 
variable that seems to be important in diversification is the institutional environment as measured 
by the durability of political regimes in a country. The results suggest that the more durable a 
regime is the more likely the country will be diversified. This is not surprising because a more 
durable political regime is in a better position to put in place measures that are needed to improve 
the prospects for successful diversification. Other control variables, such as the inflation rate and 
the level of development, had coefficients that are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. 
To further test the robustness of our analyses, we estimated the equations using a different measure 
of resource endowment. In particular, we examined the role of oil endowments in diversification. 
The results are presented in table 9.  
 
 15
 
Table 9: Impact of Oil Endowment 
 GMM1: Benchmark GMM2 GMM3 
Diversification (t-1) 0.766 *** 
(0.000) 
0.761 *** 
(0.000) 
0.755 *** 
(0.000) 
Aid (% of gross capital formation) -0.008 ** 
(0.014) 
-0.008 *** 
(0.004) 
-0.009 *** 
(0.000) 
Oil endowment  -2.539 * 
(0.077) 
-3.156 * 
(0.092) 
-3.264 * 
(0.096) 
Level of development -0.001 
(0.264) 
-0.001 
(0.186) 
-0.001 *** 
(0.003) 
Inflation rate -0.011 
(0.368) 
-0.011 
(0.374) 
-0.011 
(0.340) 
Education -0.015 
(0.667) 
0.002 
(0.958) 
-0.003 
(0.952) 
Quality of infrastructure 0.169 *** 
(0.000) 
0.159 *** 
(0.000) 
0.175 *** 
(0.000) 
Durability of political regime 0.068 
(0.117) 
0.069 
(0.138) 
0.057 
(0.197) 
Geography 
• Distcr 
 
 
• Pop100cr 
 
 
• Troppop 
 
-0.001 
(0.873) 
 
 
 
 
2.379 
(0.539) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.874 
(0.230) 
    
Hansen test 15.85 
(1.000) 
10.63 
(1.000) 
11.81 
(1.000) 
Test for AR(1) errors -3.16 *** 
(0.002) 
-3.19 *** 
(0.001) 
-3.16 *** 
(0.002) 
Test for AR(2) errors -0.62 
(0.533) 
-0.63 
(0.527) 
-0.61 
(0.545) 
No of countries 22 22 22 
No of observations 356 356 356 
Notes: GMM1 refers to the benchmark regression estimation where we use distcr as a measure of geography; GMM2 is estimation using pop100cr as 
a measure of geography; and GMM3 is estimation using troppop as a measure of geography. 
 
 
As shown in table 9, oil has a negative effect on diversification and this effect is statistically 
significant at 5 percent level. The results therefore support the popular view that resource 
abundance can have a negative effect on diversification. Another interesting thing to note in the 
table is that the measure of institutional environment is no longer significant when we use oil, rather 
than land, as a measure of resource endowment or abundance. The durability of political regime, 
our measure of institutional environment, still has a positive sign but is no longer significant at 
conventional levels. With the exception of these two differences noted above, the results on the 
other variables are similar to those of the benchmark model estimation. 
 
 
V. Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks 
 
Trade has an important role to play in the economic development of African countries. However, 
the region is facing serious challenges in promoting both traditional and non-traditional exports as 
well as in effectively exploiting the potential of international trade for growth and poverty 
 16
reduction. Recent evidence suggests that the region has lost market shares for some of its traditional 
exports (UNCTAD, 2003). Regarding non-traditional exports, the region continues to face 
difficulties in diversifying into the production and export of dynamic products and so has been 
unable to derive significant benefits from the tremendous growth that has taken place in world 
trade. This paper examined the validity of three popular explanations for lack of diversification in 
Africa using  unbalanced panel data for selected African countries spanning the period 1985-2002. 
The estimation is based on a System-GMM approach that accounts for the endogeneity of 
regressors and controls for key macroeconomic variables identified in the literature as potential 
determinants of diversification.  
 
The empirical evidence suggests that aid, quality of infrastructure, and resource endowments are 
robust determinants of diversification in Africa. In particular, an increase in aid has a negative 
effect on diversification as suggested in the theoretical literature. The quality of infrastructure also 
matters in the sense that an increase in the quality of infrastructure increases diversification. The 
results suggests that resource endowment is important but that the nature of the endowment matters. 
For example, having a large oil endowment leads to a less diversified export pattern. However, land 
abundance, as measured by the ratio of arable to total land area, has a positive effect on 
diversification. The results of the empirical tests also suggest that institutional factors play a role 
although the evidence is weak because it is sensitive to the control variables used in the estimation 
and so is not robust. Regarding geography, the correlation tests suggest that there is strong co-
movement between geography and diversification. However, in the regression analysis the various 
measures of geography were not statistically significant at conventional levels. Consequently, 
although poor geography puts countries at a disadvantage, it is not a major reason for lack of 
diversification in Africa. The effect of poor geography can be reduced through the development of 
effective transport and communication infrastructure as demonstrated by the experiences of 
Switzerland and Austria that are land-locked and yet have been able to develop manufacturing 
activities.  
 
Having identified the key empirical determinants of diversification in Africa, the key question is 
what can governments do to enhance diversification efforts in the region? A key policy implication 
of the econometric results of this paper is the importance of infrastructure in diversification. 
Consequently, if African countries are to have any success in diversifying their production and 
export structure, they have to invest in infrastructure development so as to reduce transactions costs 
and make the region more competitive in the global markets for manufactured goods. This requires 
development of good transport systems as well as better access to telecommunication instruments 
and systems. Regional integration can play a key role here. Cooperation in the development of 
infrastructure will reduce costs of transporting goods across countries in the region as well as to 
global markets. It will also create a conducive environment for the expansion of intra-African trade. 
 
Another key policy recommendation emanating from the econometric  results is that policymakers 
must have a coherent strategy to manage natural resource endowments so as to avoid the possibility 
of a ‘dutch disease.’ For example, countries that have large oil endowments need to ensure that the 
resources from this endowment are used in a way that does not lead to real exchange rate 
overvaluation and consequently affect the development of export activities.  Regarding aid, the 
results suggest that it can have potentially negative consequences for diversification and so presents 
serious challenges to policymakers in aid recipient countries. There is therefore the need for public 
action in these countries to offset the potentially negative effect of aid on diversification. In this 
regard, aid can contribute to the development efforts of African countries if it is managed in a way 
that reduces the potential adverse effects on the real exchange rate. This requires: 
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• Targeting aid to the development of infrastructure and human capital as well as promotion 
of private sector investment; and 
• Ensuring that, if used for consumption, a large part of it is spent on traded as opposed to 
non-traded goods to avoid the possibility of a dutch disease. 
 
Clearly, diversification can be achieved through various ways. It could take the form of a 
movement into the production of higher value-added activities in existing export sectors. It could 
also be achieved by moving into the production of new export activities. Furthermore, it often 
occurs through the development of new export markets. The choice of diversification method and 
strategy will depend on each country’s structure as well as an assessment of which of these methods 
will provide maximum benefits to the economy. That said, it is important to emphasize that 
diversification is not an end in itself. It is useful to the extent that it enables a country to diversify 
risk, enhance growth and reduce poverty. Obviously, the likelihood that diversification will play 
this role in an economy is higher if it is accompanied by an increase in manufacturing value-added. 
History as well as empirical evidence has shown that manufacturing is the most dynamic sector in 
world trade. It is also the source of sustained economic growth, which is a necessary condition for 
poverty reduction. Consequently, if African countries are to maximize the benefits from 
diversification they must ensure that it is accompanied by an increase in manufacturing value-
added.  
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Data Appendix 
 
Most of the data used in the analysis were obtained from the World Development Indicators 2006 
published by the World Bank. Data on the three measures of geography were obtained from the 
website of the Harvard Center for International Development. Data on the durability of political 
regimes, a measure of institutional quality, were obtained from the POLITY IV database. The 22 
African countries used in the GMM estimations are: Burundi, Benin, Central African Republic, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Malawi, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe.  
 
The exact definition of the variables used in the estimations is as follows: 
 
1. Diversification is defined as the share of manufactures in total exports. Obtained from 
World Bank African Development Indicators 2005; data on the share of manufacturing 
value added in GDP were also obtained from the same source; 
2. Aid is defined as official development assistance (expressed as a percentage of gross capital 
formation); 
3. Resource endowment is defined as the share of arable to total land area. A second measure 
of resource endowment used is a dummy variable for oil producers and exporters. The 
dummy takes the value 1 if a country produces and exports oil and zero otherwise; 
4. The level of development is measured by real per capita GDP (PPP based); 
5. The inflation rate is measured by the rate of change of the GDP deflator; 
6. Education is the literacy rate (adult literacy rate obtained from World Development 
Indicators 2005); 
7. Quality of infrastructure is the number of fixed line telephone per 1000 person; 
8. Durability of political regime is the duration of political regimes in a country as defined in 
the Polity IV database; 
9. distcr is the mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-navigable river (in kilometres); 
10. pop100cr is the ratio of population within 100 km of ice-free coast/navigable river to total 
population; 
11. troppop is the percentage of the population in the geographical tropics.  
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